We estimate the central bank policy preferences for the European Monetary Union and for the UK. In doing so, we extend the theoretical framework suggested by Cecchetti et al. (2002) by assuming that policy preferences change across di¤erent regimes either due to the di¤erent phases of the business cycle, or due to changes in propagation mechanism, or due to volatility shifts of the underlying structural shocks. Our empirical results suggest that the weight that policy makers put on in ‡ation is typically profound. Furthermore, it appears that volatility shifts of the economic disturbances is the main factor, which generates variation in policy preferences.
Introduction
In the last two decades, it has become rather evident for the central banks of most, if not all, developed economies that as long as there are no signs of recession in the horizon the objective of achieving and/or maintaining price stability outranks their other statutory objectives, such as reducing unemployment or stimulating growth. Svensson (2001) argues that de…ning price stability boils down to establishing a monetary policy loss function and in turn maintaining price stability involves minimizing the policy maker's loss function.
While it is easy to show that under a quadratic loss function and linear policy constraints, the optimal interest rate rule is a linear function of state variables, the estimated coe¢ cients are a convolution of the parameters describing policy preferences and the underlying economic structure. Hence, the estimated policy rule is a reduced-form model, which cannot be used to address questions concerning the policy formulation process since it is inherently di¢ cult to interpret changes in the optimal reaction function. In other words, it averages out changes in the estimated parameters of the optimal reaction function although such changes could arise due to very di¤erent factors such as a shift in policy preferences, or a change of the central bank's targets, or due to a reduction of the exogenous shocks, or a more e¢ cient implementation of the monetary policy.
In this spirit, a large body of research tries to identify the reasons behind the great moderation, the greater stability of output and in ‡ation in the 1980s and 1990s, the most common of which involve better monetary policy, structural changes of inventory management and good luck. However, potential changes of policy preferences seem to have been ignored. A small albeit pivotal strand of the relevant literature (Cecchetti et al. 2002; Cecchetti, 1998; Dennis 2006; Favero and Raveli, 2003; Ozlale, 2003) has endeavoured to actually obtain estimates of the so-called deep factors such as policy preferences. The key and intuitively plausible assumption that is underlined in all these studies is that over time policy preferences are expected to change and with them the monetary policies of central banks. For this reason, they provide estimates of the changes in the monetary policy preferences typically by splitting the samples into di¤erent periods often using structural breaks and stability tests. One of the main disadvantages of this approach is that in a forward looking model agents form expectations accounting for possible parameter changes in the future. The rationale is presented in Davig and Leeper (2007) and Cooley et al. (1982) . 1 In this paper, we introduce an approach that allows for economic agents to form expectations that also account for possible parameter changes in the future.
In particular, we adopt the Markov Regime Switching (henceforth MRS) technique so as to make state dependent both the policy maker's loss function and the optimal policy rule that emerges from it. In the same spirit, Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) provide a convincing argument as to why the loss function of a central bank should depend on the state that the economy is in. They use a loss function the implication of which is that the central bank is more reactive to in ‡ation, or alternatively to output-gap, with deviations from their target level occurring when the economy is in expansion rather than in recession. Beck et al. (2002) generalize this framework and assume a state dependent loss function. Svensson and Williams (2007) and Blake and Zampolli (2010) examine the impact of model uncertainty in the case of the optimal policy rule. Both of these studies assume a quadratic loss function subject to state variables, the dynamics of which follow a Markov process 2 We demonstrate empirically the usefulness of our approach by estimating the monetary policy preferences of the European Monetary Union (EMU) countries and of the United Kingdom (UK), a selection that is particularly interesting nowadays because recently the consensus on optimal monetary policy has changed within a short period of time. In fact, evidence of high in ‡ation and low economic growth before the Lehmann Brothers collapse in September 2008 has raised a heated debate as to whether the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England should focus on achieving their in ‡ation target or on promoting economic growth by relaxing monetary policy at the expense of their credibility in not pursuing the objective of price stability. Furthermore, estimating the monetary policy preferences of the EMU and of the UK becomes even more fascinating given that in the period after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers the major central banks around the world have reduced interest rates at historically low levels, shifting now the debate on to the question of whether a loose monetary policy should be coordinated with an expansionary …scal policy.
From a general perspective, our approach can be viewed as generalising the framework suggested by Cecchetti et al. (2002) by allowing also both policy preferences and the dynamic constraints faced by a central treating regime shifts as a one-o¤ event rather than as an ongoing process, is logically inconsistent since agents form expectations that re ‡ect the belief that a regime change is possible. We refer the interested reader to these papers for more in-depth discussions of the topic. Sims et al. (2006) also present empirical evidence, which supports the view that regime changes are not monotonic. 2 bank to be regime dependent, e¤ectively changing across the business cycle. To this end, we assume that policy makers minimize a regime dependent quadratic loss function subject to the dynamics of state variables, which follow a Markov process. Subsequently, in this set up the policy reaction function becomes state dependent. Our modelling approach is in line with Salemi (1995) and Sack (2000) who solve an optimal control problem, where the dynamic constraints are estimated using a linear VAR. In particular, following Blake and Zampolli (2010), we estimate policy preferences by solving a dynamic programing problem where the state-variables and shock variances are regime dependent. 3 We may note that the framework employed by Blake and Zampolli (2010) is very general and it does not facilitate the identi…cation of what drives regime shifts and knowing whether such shifts are the result of level e¤ects (i.e. di¤erences across high and low levels of output and in ‡ation); or policy changes; or changes in shock variances; or changes in the propagation mechanism. We bypass this restriction by estimating policy preferences based on regimes that are identi…ed under four di¤erent sets of assumptions. In particular, we estimate a model where only the mean is allowed to change across di¤erent regimes; then a model where only the variance of reduced-form shocks takes state dependent values; then a model where only the autoregressive parameters change; and …nally, a model where all parameters are allowed to change.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of optimal monetary policy. Section 3 overviews the econometric methodology used to estimate monetary policy preferences and, Section 4 discusses the data utilized and the empirical results of the study. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
Formalizing Monetary Policy Preferences
This section describes the estimation of central banks' policy preferences. In particular, central banks face an optimal control problem where the dynamics of state variables is assumed to be given by the point estimates of a Markov-switching structural VAR (MS-SVAR). By using the estimated structure and by assuming that the actions of central banks are optimal, we can recover the objective function.
We begin with a simple static model that Cecchetti et al. (2002) uses and then we introduce dynamics in line with Sack(2000) . The advantage of the simple static model is that it represents the medium-run response and the trade-o¤ that central banks face, while the dynamic model esti-mates long-run policy preferences and allows us, amongst other things, to test for the robustness of the results we obtain from the static model. Note that unlike Cecchetti et al. (2002) and Sack (2000) , who use a linear VAR model to account for the dynamics of state variables, we use a Markov regime switching model.
Our approach is close to the methodology suggested by Blake and Zampolli (2010), who …rst solve a Markov switching reduced-form rational expectations model, and based on this solution they produce an optimal time consistent policy rule. The key di¤erence between our study and that of Blake and Zampolli (2010) is that in the …rst step instead of solving a Markov switching reduced-form rational expectations model, we use a reduced-form MS-VAR model to proxy economic dynamics and market expectations. However, in the second step and in line with Blake and Zampolli (2010), we choose an optimal policy rule consistent with the rule obtained in the …rst step.
Estimation of Policy Preferences: The static case
We follow Cecchetti et al. (2002) and derive the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output gap variability by assuming that a central bank minimizes a quadratic loss function (QLF), which is subject to linear demand and supply curves: 4
where is in ‡ation, = E( ) is the in ‡ation target set by a central bank, y denotes output gap, y = E(y) is the target of output gap and i t is the short-term nominal interest rate. The coe¢ cient is the weight that the central bank attaches to in ‡ation relative to output stabilization, is the inverse slope of the supply curve and is the slope of the aggregate demand curve; d t and s t stand for the demand and the supply shocks respectively. In this framework, represents the medium-run trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output-gap variability. Cecchetti et al. (2002) show that the parameter of policy preferences is given as a function of the unconditional variances of in ‡ation (i.e. 2 ) and output gap (i.e. 2 y ) and the estimated value of : 5
Equation (4) has the property that for = 0 (the central bank only cares about output-gap variability), 2 y = 2 = 0. Likewise, for = 1 (the central bank only cares about in ‡ation variability), 2 y = 2 = 1: We can trace out the entire output-in ‡ation variability frontier by allowing to vary between 0 and 1.
We extent the model presented in equations (1)-(3) to a regime switching framework and we obtain a state dependent version of (4), as in (5):
Equation (5) shows that given the unconditional values of 2 y (S t ) and 2 (S t ) the policy preferences of the central bank change as the slope of supply (1= St ) curve changes across di¤erent regimes. 6 Estimates of policy preferences by Checchetti et al. (2002) are based on the assumption that the VAR parameters remain constant over a signi…cant historical period. However, in the case of the EMU, policy went through di¤erent regimes. This implies that we need to adopt a statistical model, which accounts for regime changes. Here, we estimate (5) by employing the MS-SVAR suggested by Ehrmann et al. (2003) . In line with Cecchetti et al. (2002) we compute the inverse slope 1= (s t ) at each regime as the 12-quarter average of the impact of policy shock on output, divided by the 12-quarter average impact on in ‡ation.
Estimation of Policy Preferences in a Dynamic Model
We follow Sack (2000) in an attempt to make the analysis more realistic and we introduce dynamics in both demand and supply curves. Sack (2000) solves for an optimal policy rule that minimizes a quadratic loss function subject to dynamics as implied by the VAR estimates. However, we allow policy preferences and economic dynamics to change across the business cycle. Thus, the policy maker minimizes a quadratic intertem-poral regime-dependent loss function: 7
subject to:
where z t = [y t t ] 0 , R(St) is the regime-dependent matrix of the weights attached to in ‡ation and output-gap stability and i t is the policy instrument. The interaction between the structure of the economy and the policy reaction function would generate an identi…cation problem. We get around this problem by estimating (7) and (8) using a Markovswitching structural VAR (MS-SVAR) model. In doing so we impose, in each regime, the same recursive structure used by Sack (2000) . In particular, we assume that the relevant policy instrument does not enter into the in ‡ation and output equations contemporaneously (i.e. B 0 = 0). We also impose the restriction that in ‡ation does not a¤ect output contemporaneously.
To solve the optimization problem we construct a state vector, which includes current and lagged values of non-policy variables z t and lagged values of the policy variable i t as follows:
X t = [z t ; z t 1; :::; z t p+1 ; i t 1 ; i t 2 ; :::i t p ] 0 = [y t ; ::y t p+1 ; t ; :::; t p+1 ; i t 1 ; ::
The optimal policy will be a solution to the following Bellman equation:
subject to
where V (X t ; S t = i) is the continuation value function of the dynamic programing problem at time t written as a function of the state vector X t and the unobserved variable S t : The random variable S t is assumed to form a Markov chain in = f1; 2; :::N g with transition probability
The transition probability p ij is the probability that the economy switches from the current state i to future state j. We assume that the policy makers know the current state of the economy but they are uncertain about the future state. 8 The following matrices A and B depend on the value of the unobserved state variable S t ; and for i 2 f1; 2; ::N g; they are given by 6 4 where the coe¢ cients a k jl , for k = 1; :::; p 1, indicates the impact of non-policy variable l on non-policy variable j , b k li shows the impact of the policy instrument on the non-policy variable l and c l is the intercept of the non-policy variable l. 9 The superscript k show the lagged value of the relevant variable. 10 Given the linear quadratic nature of the problem and assuming further that the value function is quadratic,
the …rst order conditions will give a set of decision rules of the following form:
where
8 Note that the current state of the economy is given by the …lter probability P (S t = ij t ); where t is the information set available at time t. For details concerning the computation of …lter probability see Hamilton (1994) . 9 The subscripts i; j used in a k jl and b k li are not the same as those used in the transition probability p ij . 10 Note that we compute the C; A and B by using the point estimates from the MS-VAR. (13) and (11) and (13) can be written as follows: 11
The optimal decision rule (11) depends on the uncertainty concerning which regime will prevail in the future. 12 However, the response coef-…cients given in (12) are independent of the variance-covariance matrix i of the zero-mean disturbances t . Thus, with respect to t , certainty equivalence holds but not with respect to the matrices of the stochastic parameters. Equation (11) and (13) can be solved by substituting the former into the latter and then iterating the resulting Riccati equation to converge, thereby obtaining a solution for V i . Once we obtain a solution for V i ; F i can be determined recursively.
The optimal policy rule in (11) is a function of ; , and y : In the results that follow, we assume that = 0:99, = 2 and y is equal to the sample mean of output growth. For any choice of (S t ) the optimal policy rule can be calculated. We compute the optimal weights (S t ) by minimizing the distance between the optimal policy rate and the actual rate where the distance is measured as the residual sum of squared deviations.
Econometric Methodology
A key input in estimating policy preferences for the static dynamic model is the point estimates of a MS-SVAR model. 13 MS SVAR is a twostep procedure combining two important developments of VAR analysis: Markov regime-switching and identi…cation. In the …rst step we estimate a reduced-form MS VAR model, where we allow all estimated parameters to be state dependent:
In the second step, we identify the impulse matrix B(s t ); which can be used to extract the contemporaneous interactions among the elements of X t . Identi…cation of B(s t ) requires n 2 restrictions within each regime. Estimation of (s t ) provides [n(n + 1)=2] restrictions. Thus, full iden-ti…cation requires another n(n 1)=2 extra restrictions. Sims (1992) derives these restrictions by ordering endogenous variables recursively. 14 We choose the recursive form of identi…cation by imposing the restriction that the policy instrument does not enter into the in ‡ation and output equations. 15 We also impose the restriction that in ‡ation does not a¤ect output contemporaneously. The model in (15) and (16) allows all the parameters to be a¤ected by regime shifts. In such a setup, it is not clear what distinguishes the di¤erent regimes. In particular, it is not clear if changes of the unobserved state variable are associated with the phase of business cycles (i.e. switches in the intercept), with changes in the propagation mechanism (i.e. changes in the dynamic structure of the autoregressive MS-VAR coe¢ cients) or with the changes of the MS-VAR errors (i.e. changes in the variance of innovations). To examine the impact of the possible 13 Note that we compute St in (5) by using the regime-depedent impulse responses of output and in ‡ation to interest rate shocks. Alternatively, point estimates of the reduced-form MS-VAR are used as an input in (10) . 14 In this set up, endogenous variables are ordered and it is assumed that the fundamental disturbances have contemporaneous e¤ects on the variable in question itself and on all the other variables below it. 15 The same recursive identi…cation scheme has been used by Ehrmann et al. (2003) .
sources of regimes shifts, we estimate four di¤erent models. The …rst model, presented in (15) and (16), accounts for the joint contribution of all potential factors. We denote this general model as model A.
Then, we estimate a model under the assumption that only the intercepts change across regimes, while the autoregressive parameters and the variance covariance matrix of reduced-form shocks remain constant. In this setup regimes are identi…ed as low and high growth and high and low in ‡ation. We call this model as model B:
Note that the impact matrice B remains constant across di¤erent regimes (i.e. B(S t ) = B): Therefore, the impulse responses are not a¤ected by changes of c(S t ) and policy preferences as computed by (5) in the static model are independent of regime shifts. However, this is not the case for the dynamic model where the optimal weights (S t ) as extracted by the Riccati equations in (13) are still regime-dependent. 16 For example, in (11)- (14) , even if the impact matrix is time-invariant (i.e. B j = B), the matrices of optimal reaction and the value of functions (i.e. F i ; V i ) are functions of regime-dependent matrices such as C j , A j ; and R i . If the static model is true then we do not expect, in the dynamic model, policy preferences to change across the di¤erent states of the unobserved variable S t . Then, and in line with the main bulk of the literature on great moderation, we assume that regime changes are driven by better luck. We consider a MS-VAR model where regime shifts are con…ned to the variance of structural innovations while the impulse matrix B is invariant across the states of S t . 17 Thus, in the static model, policy preferences remain unchanged across di¤erent regimes. We call this model, model C:
Lanne et al. (2010) show that identi…cation of B can be achieved if:
and
is a diagonal matrix with positive elements. If there are only two regimes (i.e., S t = 1; 2 ) identi…cation requires that the elements of (S t ) are distinct. Model C has been used in the great moderation literature to test the null hypothesis of good luck.
Finally, we estimate a model where only the propagation mechanism, as computed by the autoregressive matrices is subject to regime shifts:
We call equation (21) model D. Note that the autoregressive parameters re ‡ect both the formation of market expectations and structural relationships among economic agents. However, the economic behavior of market agents described by the impulse matrix B is assumed to be constant across regimes. Thus, changes in the propagation mechanism are driven by changes in market expectations. 18 Model D indicates the impact that changes in the formation of market expectations have on policy preferences.
Data and Empirical Results
This section discusses our empirical results concerning both the static and dynamic models. We focus on the cases of the euro area and of the UK. In what follows we utilize a trivariate MS VAR model, which includes the policy instrument, in ‡ation and output growth. We allow both the VAR coe¢ cients and the coe¢ cients of variance covariance matrix to vary across states. We also employ a four-variable model by adding the spread between the 6-year long-term and 3-month short-term interest rate into the trivariate model. We include the spread between long-term and short-term interest rate as the proxy for market expectations. We use on a monthly basis the three-month treasury bill rate as a proxy for the policy instrument. The treasury bill rate is available both for all countries used to construct the euro area series and for the whole period of investigation. 19 , 20 We also use monthly CPI and industrial production to construct the in ‡ation rate and the industrial production growth rate. 21 
Estimation of Policy Preferences: The Case of the Static Model
We compute the policy preferences and the slope of the supply curve for the period March 1979 to August 2008. 22 , 23 Figure 1 shows the …lter probabilities of regime 1 for model A. In line with empirical regularities, the probability of regime 1 in EMU is low for the period before 1986 where eleven realignments took place. The probability of regime 1 is also low in 1990 when the German uni…cation took place and the low economic growth in EMU emerged. 24 The probability of regime 1 falls during the speculative attacks in 1992, 1993 and 1995. Thus, the …lter probabilities provide strong evidence that regime 1 is associated with the high growth and low volatility regime. Similarly, in the UK the probability of regime 1 is broadly in line with evidence produced elsewhere. Speci…cally, Benati (2008) shows that the long-run response to in ‡ation was weaker for the period before 1979-1990 and there was a marked increase under the Thatcher administration. There was also a further increase after the introduction of the October 1992 in ‡ation targeting regime. 25 Thus, the probability of regime 1 19 Euro area data are constructed as a weighted average of seven EMU countries. Namely, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland. Although the aggregate GDP of these represents more than 92 percent of euro area GDP, we scale the weight so that it represents 100 percent of euro area GDP. The weights are taken from an updated vesrion of the Area-Wide Model (AWM) database (see Fagan, Henry and Mestre 2001). In particular we use the following weights: For Germany 0.362, for France 0.242, for Italy 0.165, for Spain 0.097, for the Netherlands 0.067, for Belgium 0.042 and for Finland 0.021. 20 We could also use the short-term money market rate given by the 60b line of International Financial Statistics (IFS) data base. However, it is only available for the period before the introduction of the euro single currency. 21 Data for CPI and industrial production were extracted from lines 64 and 99 of the IFS data base. 22 We exclude, in our analysis, the period after the recent …nancial crisis because of the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates problem. 23 We have picked up the number of lags in the estimation of the reduced form MS-VAR models using the Akaike Information Criterion. 24 Both incidents raised doubts about the optimality of low in ‡ation policy pursued by the Deutsche Bundesbank. 25 Benati (2008) , who, using a time-varying structural VAR analysis, shows that there is violation of the Taylor principle during the 1980s, where the estimated longrun in ‡ation coe¢ cient ‡uctuates between 0.7 and 0.8. However, after the introduction of the October 1992 in ‡ation targeting the long-run coe¢ cient on in ‡ation is low in periods where monetary policy violates the Taylor principle by accommodating in ‡ationary pressures. Under such circumstances, expected in ‡ation becomes self-ful…lling. This implies that if regime 1 coincides with active monetary policy then the level and the volatility of in ‡ation is expected to be lower in regime 1 than in regime 2. The probability of regime 1 is also low for the period between 2001 and 2003. 26 Figures 2 and 3 are based on a trivariate MS-SVAR model and present the impulse response of in ‡ation to monetary policy shocks both for the UK and for the EMU. 27 There is some evidence of the price puzzle in both regimes but it is a lot more persistent and stronger in regime 2. It is worth noting at this point, however, that the price puzzle might be an artefact of an omitted variable such as expected in ‡ation. 28 Canova et al. (2007) get round the omitted variable problem by using proxies of expected in ‡ation. 29 Here, we use as a proxy of expected in ‡ation the spread between the six-year long-term interest rate and the three-month treasury bill rate. However, the price puzzle is still somewhat present even in the augmented four-variable MS-SVAR model. 30 Evidence of the price puzzle after accounting for expected in ‡ation indicates that either the proxy of expected in ‡ation is not accurate or that the price puzzle is due to supply shocks. 31 In summary, although model A encompasses all potential factors, which drive regime shifts, the …lter probabilities and the impulse response function provide evidence that regime 2 coincides with passive monetary policy, self-ful…lling expectations, high in ‡ation and high volatility. At this point it is worth noting that the volatility changes could also increased substantially reaching a value of 1.4. 26 Groen et al. (2009) argue that there may have been temporary breaks induced by the large volatilities in housing and energy market after 2000. Groen et al. (2009) show, by developing a multivariate extension of the CUSUM test, that the UK RPI in ‡ation was subject to structural breaks in 2001, 2003 and 2005. 27 The con…dence intervals have been computed using bootstrapping. For more details see Ehrmann et al. (2001) and the Appendix of this paper. 28 If a VAR omits expected in ‡ation then the supposed monetary policy shock will capture the positive correlation between in ‡ation and the relevant policy rate. 29 Bernake, Boivin an Eliaz (2005) and Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov (2009) also tackle the omitted variable problem by allowing some factors extracted by a large dataset to enter into the VAR. come from two non-exclusive sources: changes of the unforecastable disturbances and/or changes of how these disturbances propagate throughout the whole economy. Below, we discuss how our results change when we estimate the policy preferences by controlling for each potential source of regime shifts.
The third and the fourth column of Table 1 presents the results from the trivariate and the quadrivariate model A. The …rst observation is that most of the (S t )s are very high. Estimated policy preferences indicate that both the EMU and the UK put more weight on in ‡ation stability, than on output growth stability, in the regime where the slope of the supply curve (i.e. 1= ) is steeper. 32 Countries emphasize price stability in regimes where the disin ‡ation cost in terms of output growth is low.
Next, the …fth and the sixth columns of Table 1 present the results from Model B in which only the intercept is allowed to change across regimes. Although in this setup policy preferences are time-invariant, the results are still comparable to those obtained from Model A. In particular, the weights on in ‡ation are still high both for the EMU and for the UK. However, for the EMU, while in the trivariate case the weight on in ‡ation is lower than the relevant weights of Model A, it is higher in the model that includes four variables. 33 The results seem to be driven by the slope of optimal policy frontier, which is ‡atter for higher values of : 34 Thus, policy makers emphasize in ‡ation in regimes where the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output growth variability is lower. For the UK, in ‡ation has higher impact on policy maker's loss function in Model A than in Model B, which implies that it is not only the phase of the business cycle that a¤ects the policy preferences but also changes in the magnitude of the VAR forecast errors and/or changes of how these disturbances propagate throughout the economy.
Then we turn to examine the impact that changes in the volatility of forecast errors have on policy preferences. Columns seven and eight present the results from Model C in which only changes in the volatility of the forecast errors are allowed to change across regimes. We observe that for the trivariate case the weights put on in ‡ation both for the EMU and the UK are slightly lower than the average value of weights estimated in Model A. However, for the extended model the importance of in ‡ation on the policy maker's loss function is higher in model C than in model A. Note also that in model C the behaviour and expectations of economic agents, as re ‡ected in the impact matrix and in the autogregressive coe¢ cients, are assumed to be invariant across the di¤erent volatility states. Thus, in this setup, volatility changes are perceived as structural breaks -which the relevant literature often calls endogenous to signify the fact that they are modelled. Our results indicate that policy makers follow a policy against the wind: they respond to the uncertainty concerning the variance of structural shocks by increasing the weight they put on in ‡ation. We also observe that for the UK the slope of the optimal policy frontier is almost ‡at, which indicates that there is no trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output-growth. 35 Finally, the last two columns of Table 1 present the results from Model D in which only the propagation mechanism is allowed to change across regimes. The results show very little support that this mechanisms produces changes since not only is the weight on in ‡ation less than the corresponding weights of Model A but also the results from the quadrivariate EMU model are rather implausible. However, the lower weights on in ‡ation in Model D, does not necessarily imply that the propagation mechanism has no role on the switches of policy preferences. But it does indicate at the very least that it is not the only factor.
Overall, the results from the static model imply that all factors are likely to play a role in the di¤erence of policy preferences. However, it is worth noting that the evidence from Model C underline more emphatically the importance of in ‡ation as compared to the more ‡exible Model A. Thus, a key …nding is that the uncertainty concerning the volatility of structural shocks might be the most important factor that yields changes in policy preferences.
The Case of the Dynamic Model
The static model simpli…es the analysis by looking only at the mediumhorizon averages and by estimating the slope of the supply curve based on impulse responses. However, evidence of price puzzle and question marks about the ability of structural VAR to identify structural shocks, demands further tests to robustify our inference. 36 Thus, we adopt the framework suggested by Blake and Zampolli (2010) and by recursive estimates of equations (11)- (14) we obtain an optimal policy path for the policy instrument. In doing so, we compute the optimal weights by minimizing the distance between the optimal policy rate and the actual rate where the distance is measured by the residual sum of squared deviations.
The results of this exercise are summarized in Table 2 . For the general Model A presented in the third and fourth columns, the results are consistent with the basic results obtained from the static model; but only for regime 1. Note that on the basis of …lter probabilities and empirical regularities, we argue above that regime 1 coincides with the low volatility high growth regime. Thus, we observe that the weights put on in ‡ation are high only for the low volatility regime. Similarly, the striking …nding is the very low weights on in ‡ation in the high volatility regime. And although the low volatility regime is associated with the high-growth period, evidence of low weights on in ‡ation is not consistent with the results of Table 1 and the weights found in earlier studies that used a linear framework. The key implication of our results is that in a low growth regime, policy makers seem to switch policy preferences to some extent from in ‡ation to output growth. This is consistent with evidence from Model C where the weight put on in ‡ation is low in both regimes. The low in ‡uence of in ‡ation on policy preferences might be due to the possibility of regime changes. For example, expectations that the high volatility regime can appear again in the future might a¤ect current policy preferences. However, the low relative weight on in ‡ation is not consistent with results obtained from the static analysis of Model C. The discrepancies between the static and dynamic analysis might be due to the fact that the static analysis re ‡ects the medium-run trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output-gap stabilization while the dynamic analysis focuses on the long-run trade o¤. Estimates from Model B and D indicate that policy makers do indeed follow a policy against the wind; they focus only on the stabilization of in ‡ation. The only exception to this rule is Model D for the UK with four-variables, where the weight put on in ‡ation is rather low in both regimes.
In summary, the results from the dynamic analysis seem rather mixed. In the majority of the cases examined, policy makers appear to focus mainly on in ‡ation stability. And unlike the overall picture drawn from the dynamic analysis, Model C indicates that in ‡ation has low weight on policy makers'objective function.
Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to estimate the monetary policy preferences of the EMU countries and of the UK, which we undertake by building upon the framework suggested by Cecchetti et al. (2002) and extending it with policy preferences that change across the di¤erent regimes. Speci…cally, we assume that the stochastic process of in ‡ation and output gap follows a Markov process, and we estimate policy preferences …rst for a model with no dynamics in the demand and supply curves and second for a more realistic model where dynamics are introduced. Moreover, we have also examined the impact of the three main factors to determine the source of the regime shifts, namely the di¤erent phases of the business cycle, changes of the underlying propagation mechanism, and volatility shifts of the structural shocks.
Our empirical results from the static model show that monetary policy makers in the EMU and in the UK put a lot of weight on in ‡ation variability. The static analysis also shows that the main source of the time variation of policy preferences is the volatility change of economic disturbances. In the same vein, the dynamic analysis also provides evidence that policy makers put a lot of emphasis on in ‡ation stability. However, there are some notable exceptions. For example, in the high volatility regime of the general model (Model A) the relative importance of in ‡ation in the policy objective function is low. Also in line with the static analysis, we observe that volatility shifts of economic disturbances is the main factor to drive variations of policy preferences. But unlike the static analysis, the weight that is put on in ‡ation stability is lower for the model in which regime shifts are driven by volatility changes.
Figure 1: Filter probabilities of the low volatility regime
Notes: the two graphs depict for the UK and the EMU the filter probability at each point in time that the process is in regime 1; the complement of this gives the probability that the process is in the other regime. Notes: the impulse-response graphs depict for the first (Regime 1) and the second (Regime 2) volatility regimes the response of inflation to a (positive) shock in interest rates. The upper and lower lines in each graph are the 84% and 16% confidence intervals respectively obtained by bootstrapping.
Notes: the impulse-response graphs depict for the first (Regime 1) and the second (Regime 2) volatility regimes the response of inflation to a (positive) shock in interest rates. The upper and lower lines in each graph are the 84% and 16% confidence intervals respectively obtained by bootstrapping. The combination of the quadratic loss function, equation (1), and the linear constraints, equations (2) and (3), yields a linear reaction function, as in equation (22):
Substituting this optimal policy relationship, equation (22), into equations (2) and (3), we obtain the respective variances 2 y and 2 . Thus, we can write (1) in terms of 2 y and 2 : Then minimization of (1) yields:
and b = (
Substituting (23) and (24) into 2 y and 2 , it is easy to show that the ratio 2 y = 2 is a function of the policy preferences ; and of the inverse of the slope of the supply curve ; as in equation (25):
Using the unconditional values of 2 and 2 y and the estimated value of ; we can infer the policy preference parameter . Equation (25) has the property that for = 0 (the central bank only cares about output-gap variability), 2 y = 2 = 0. Likewise, for = 1 (the central bank only cares about in ‡ation variability), 2 y = 2 = 1: We can trace out the entire output-in ‡ation variability frontier by allowing to vary between 0 and 1.
There is empirical evidence (Hamilton and Lin, 1996; Ang and Bekaert, 1998) that macroeconomic variables follow a regime switching process. Thus, we can also extent the loss function (1) to account for a statedependent Philips curve: 37 E t [L t jS t ; t ] = p t L e + (1 p t )L R 37 For an analysis of changing monetary policy objectives see Debortoli and Nunes (2008) . subject to (28) and (29):
where t is the information set available at time t; S t is an unobserved state variable at time t, p t indicates the probability for given t; S t is in expansion (i.e. P (S = ej t ), where the subscripts e and R indicate that the relevant variables are in expansion and recession respectively. In line with the linear model we can show the optimal policy frontier in a state-dependant format, as in equation (30): 
Bootstrapping
The procedure consists of …ve steps: 1) Create a history for the unobserved state S t : This can be done recursively using the estimation of transition probability matrix P . At each point of time we draw random number from the uniform distribution [0,1] and compare it with the estimated transition probability to determine whether there is regime switching.
2) Create history for the endogenous variables. This is done recursively on the basis of estimated models presented in (17)- (21) . All parameters are replaced by their estimated values and residuals are drawn from a standard normal distribution u t~N (0; I n ): The di¤erent models are then estimated recursively using the arti…cial hidden state S t generated above.
3) Estimation of MS VAR. Estimate a MS VAR using the arti…cial data generated in step one and two. Estimation gives bootstrapping estimates of parameters presented in models (17)-(21). 4) Identi…cation. Impose the same identifying restrictions on the arti…cial data as those imposed on the actual data. This step provides bootstrapping estimates of the structural parameters. 5) Calculate the bootstrapping estimates of the response vector. Compute the impulse response by substituting the bootstrapping estimates of impulse and autoregressive matrices into the impulse response functions.
